Attributions for ML-based ICS anomaly detection: From theory to practice


Clement Fung, Eric Zeng, Lujo Bauer **Carnegie Mellon University**






Carnegie Mellon University Security and Privacy Institute

What are industrial control systems?










What are industrial control systems?


Read sensor values from physical process






What are industrial control systems?


Read sensor values from physical process








































Security and Privacy Institute









11






Trained DL-based reconstruction model









Trained DL-based reconstruction model









Security and Privacy Institute

14









 Attribution methods: explain what input features cause a model to produce a specific output




- Attribution methods: explain what input features cause a model to produce a specific output
 - When a model predicts a label, why?



- Attribution methods: explain what input features cause a model to produce a specific output
 - When a model predicts a label, why?








- Attribution methods: explain what input features cause a model to produce a specific output
 - When a model predicts a label, why?








- Attribution methods: explain what input features cause a model to produce a specific output
 - When a model predicts a label, why?









- Attribution methods: explain what input features cause a model to produce a specific output
 - When a model predicts a label, why?




Goldfinch DL-based model Which input pixels caused the prediction?




- Attribution methods: explain what input features cause a model to produce a specific output
 - When a model predicts a label, why?









- Attribution methods: explain what input features cause a model to produce a specific output
 - When a model predicts a label, why?








- Attribution methods: explain what input features cause a model to produce a specific output
 - When a model predicts a label, why?








25

- Attribution methods: explain what input features cause a model to produce a specific output
 - When a model predicts a label, why?



ecurity and Privacy Institute

In this work: exploring ICS anomaly attribution

1. (How well) do prior, off-the-shelf attribution strategies work for ICS anomaly attribution?



In this work: exploring ICS anomaly attribution

- 1. (How well) do prior, off-the-shelf attribution strategies work for ICS anomaly attribution?
- 2. How do **properties of ICS attacks** affect attribution accuracy?



In this work: exploring ICS anomaly attribution

- 1. (How well) do prior, off-the-shelf attribution strategies work for ICS anomaly attribution?
- 2. How do **properties of ICS attacks** affect attribution accuracy?
- 3. Can we do better than prior attribution strategies?



RQ1: Do prior attribution strategies work well?



We evaluate attribution in diverse settings


- Compare a variety of anomaly-detection models [1]:
 - Linear models, CNNs, RNNs, LSTMs

Fung et al. "Perspectives from a comprehensive evaluation of reconstruction-based anomaly detection in ICS." ESORICS 2022.
Goh et al. "A dataset to support research in the design of secure water treatment systems." CRITIS 2016.
A. Bathelt, N. L. Ricker, and M. Jelali, "Revision of the Tennessee Eastman process model," IFAC ADCHEM, vol. 48, no. 8. 2015.



We evaluate attribution in diverse settings


- Compare a variety of anomaly-detection models [1]:
 - Linear models, CNNs, RNNs, LSTMs
- Datasets [2,3]: SWaT, WADI, TEP
 - Water treatment (public datasets)
 - Chemical process (modified simulator)






We evaluate attribution in diverse settings

- Compare a variety of anomaly-detection models [1]:
 - Linear models, CNNs, RNNs, LSTMs
- Datasets [2,3]: SWaT, WADI, TEP
 - Water treatment (public datasets)
 - Chemical process (modified simulator)
- Attack scenarios:
 - 47 real attacks on water treatment
 - 100 synthetic attacks on chemical process
 - Made publicly available!






ICS anomaly attribution: previously






ICS anomaly attribution: previously






ICS anomaly attribution: previously

• Compare model prediction to observed ICS values




ICS anomaly attribution: previously

• Compare model prediction to observed ICS values




ICS anomaly attribution: previously

- Compare model prediction to observed ICS values
- Attribute alarm to feature with highest error (MSE)



ICS anomaly attribution: our adaptation of XAI


• Adapt local (e.g., SHAP, LEMNA) and gradient-based (e.g., saliency maps) attribution methods for anomaly detection





ICS anomaly attribution: our adaptation of XAI


- Adapt local (e.g., SHAP, LEMNA) and gradient-based (e.g., saliency maps) attribution methods for anomaly detection
- Use (i) time-series data and (ii) model as attribution method input





ICS anomaly attribution: our adaptation of XAI

- Adapt local (e.g., SHAP, LEMNA) and gradient-based (e.g., saliency maps) attribution methods for anomaly detection
- Use (i) time-series data and (ii) model as attribution method input





• Prior methods: does the attacked feature match the highest score?



- Prior methods: does the attacked feature match the highest score?
 - Not how attribution scores would be used in practice



- Prior methods: does the attacked feature match the highest score?
 - Not how attribution scores would be used in practice
- Preliminary survey of ICS operators (n=7)



- Prior methods: does the attacked feature match the highest score?
 - Not how attribution scores would be used in practice
- Preliminary survey of ICS operators (n=7)
 - Operators prefer to see multiple features, but not necessarily all



- Prior methods: does the attacked feature match the highest score?
 - Not how attribution scores would be used in practice
- Preliminary survey of ICS operators (n=7)
 - Operators prefer to see multiple features, but not necessarily all
 - Trade-off between number of features seen and accuracy

"A balanced trade-off is needed. Often having [a] list of max 10 [sensors] with minimal error rate is more useful than having less with high error rate." –P4




Sensor + actuator attribution scores




Sensor + actuator attribution scores

Search X% of features with highest scores






• AvgRank: % of features considered before finding manipulated feature



- AvgRank: % of features considered before finding manipulated feature
 - Lower AvgRank is better: operators consider fewer features, save time



 C. Hwang and T. Lee, "E-SFD: Explainable sensor fault detection in the ICS anomaly detection system," IEEE Access, vol. 9, 2021.
M. Kravchik and A. Shabtai, "Efficient cyber attack detection in industrial control systems using lightweight neural networks and PCA," IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 19, no. 4, 2022.





- Prior work [1,2] evaluates attribution on a few case-study attacks
 - Examples where attacked feature has highest MSE



- Prior work [1,2] evaluates attribution on a few case-study attacks
 - Examples where attacked feature has highest MSE
- When evaluated across our set of 147 diverse attacks:
 - Attacked feature has highest MSE in <40% of attacks




- Prior work [1,2] evaluates attribution on a few case-study attacks
 - Examples where attacked feature has highest MSE
- When evaluated across our set of 147 diverse attacks:
 - Attacked feature has highest MSE in <40% of attacks
 - On average, operators would have to consider >14% of features before finding attacked feature




Do attribution methods perform better?

• Three best-performing attribution methods (SM, SHAP, LEMNA)




Attribution methods perform worse than MSE

- Three best-performing attribution methods (SM, SHAP, LEMNA):
 - Surprisingly, attribution methods are consistently worse than MSE



Attribution methods perform worse than MSE

- Three best-performing attribution methods (SM, SHAP, LEMNA):
 - Surprisingly, attribution methods are consistently worse than MSE



RQ2: How do ICS attack properties affect attribution?



Why are attributions worse than expected?


- Broad differences among our 147 ICS attacks:
 - Detection outcomes
 - Latency, if detected, etc.
 - Input manipulation
 - Magnitude, location, pattern



Why are attributions worse than expected?

- Broad differences among our 147 ICS attacks:
 - Detection outcomes
 - Latency, if detected, etc.
 - Input manipulation
 - Magnitude, location, pattern









62


• Attributions are inaccurate within first 50 seconds



- Attributions are inaccurate within first 50 seconds
 - But improve when computed within 50-100 seconds



- Attributions are inaccurate within first 50 seconds
 - But improve when computed within 50-100 seconds
 - SM, SHAP, LEMNA now outperform MSE




Example: SWaT attack #10





Example: SWaT attack #10




Example: SWaT attack #10

Detection is late (~100s)

Option 1: "Instant"

Input window preceding anomaly start

Input is mostly benign data






Example: SWaT attack #10

Detection is late (~100s)

Option 2: "Practical"

Input window preceding detection Realistic, but late






Example: SWaT attack #10

Detection is late (~100s)

Option 3: "Ideal"


Input window begins with anomaly start

Ideal, but unknown in real time






Attribution accuracy varies by timing strategy






Attribution accuracy varies by timing strategy

• Ideal timing outperforms practical outcomes







• Ideal timing outperforms practical outcomes




• Ideal timing outperforms practical outcomes




- Ideal timing outperforms practical outcomes
- Avoiding "early" timings improves practical attribution results




- Ideal timing outperforms practical outcomes
- Avoiding "early" timings improves practical attribution results




- Ideal timing outperforms practical outcomes
- Avoiding "early" timings improves practical attribution results



- Ideal timing outperforms practical outcomes
- Avoiding "early" timings improves practical attribution results
- Attribution without alarms can be useful



- Ideal timing outperforms practical outcomes
- Avoiding "early" timings improves practical attribution results
- Attribution without alarms can be useful







Why are attributions worse than expected?


- Broad differences among our 147 ICS attacks:
 - Detection outcomes
 - Latency, if detected, etc.
 - Input manipulation
 - Magnitude, <u>location</u>, pattern









• Attribution methods: more accurate for float-valued actuators



- Attribution methods: more accurate for float-valued actuators
- Boolean-valued actuators are difficult to attribute for all methods



- Attribution methods: more accurate for float-valued actuators
- Boolean-valued actuators are difficult to attribute for all methods






RQ3: Can we do better than prior attribution strategies?




• Without knowing what attack or timing is used, can one strategy be best?







- Without knowing what attack or timing is used, can one strategy be best?
- We propose an ensemble attribution method:



- Without knowing what attack or timing is used, can one strategy be best?
- We propose an ensemble attribution method:
 - Take the average of attribution scores (MSE, SM, LEMNA) for each feature




• MSE performs worst when late






- MSE performs worst when late
- SM and LEMNA perform worst when early
 - Time-series history needed for attribution






- MSE performs worst when late
- SM and LEMNA perform worst when early
 - Time-series history needed for attribution
- Ensembles outperform all individual methods





- MSE performs worst when late
- SM and LEMNA perform worst when early
 - Time-series history needed for attribution
- Ensembles outperform all individual methods
 - At practical timings too!





Prior performance is worse than reported





Prior performance is worse than reported

ICS anomaly attribution is complex

Timing and feature types affect which methods work best





Prior performance is worse than reported

ICS anomaly attribution is complex

Timing and feature types affect which methods work best

An ensemble approach balances tradeoffs Though imperfect, attributions can help ICS operators





Artifact Evaluated

NDSS

Available Functional

Prior performance is worse than reported

ICS anomaly attribution is complex

Timing and feature types affect which methods work best

An ensemble approach balances tradeoffs

Though imperfect, attributions can help ICS operators

Clement Fung, Eric Zeng, Lujo Bauer Carnegie Mellon University clementf@cs.cmu.edu

Synthetic attacks: <u>https://doi.org/10.1184/R1/23805552</u> Modified simulator: <u>https://github.com/pwwl/tep-attack-simulator</u> Attribution code: <u>https://github.com/pwwl/ics-anomaly-attribution</u>



